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PROFESSOR DELGADO REPLIES
Richard Delgado*

Ms. Heins' response to my article contains three distinct attacks. She asserts that: (1) as a descriptive matter, Supreme Court

decisions preclude a tort action for racial epithets; (2) as a
prescriptive matter, courts should not recognize the tort even if
they are not precluded from doing so; (3) it is inappropriate to

advocate such a tort. This last assertion is a disguised claim by
Ms. Heins to politico-moral standing.

1. The descriptive claim. Of her three claims, Ms. Heins'
descriptive claim is the least interesting. We both recognize that
the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of the

tort action. And we both point to analogous case law and the
policy rationales of the first amendment to predict the Court's
outcome. Racial epithets uttered in face-to-face, one-on-one
situations marked with an inequality of power and authority' are
both similar and dissimilar to libel,2 fighting words,3 obscenity
and pornography.4 Ms. Heins highlights the differences; I em-

phasize the continuities. We come to differing conclusions.
Fair enough.'
*Professor Law, UCLA Law School. J.D. University of California, Berkeley
(Boalt Hall), 1974.
'Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 179-81 (1982)(elements of
proposed cause of action).
2
Id. at 175 n.250 (group libel analogy); Heins, Banning Words: A Comment
on "Words That Wound", 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 585, 589 (1983)(rejecting
group libel analogy).
'Delgado, supra note 1, at 173-74 (fighting words analogy).
4 Heins, supra note 2, at 587 (rejecting fighting words analagy).
' Less fair are her accusation, id., at 585-86, that I "misstate[ ]the applicable
constitutional law" by recognizing only that "a balancing test is all that is required,"
and her arch suggestion that I "must be aware that the Supreme Court's balancing
test.. .weighs heavily against infringement."
I am not only aware of this, but expressly said so: "Under first amendment
doctrine, regulation of expressive activities is scrutinized more closely when directed
at content of speech.... [A] tort for racial speech will almost surely... be subject
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However, analysis of Supreme Court cases decided in other
settings is insufficient in an area as context-sensitive and valueladen as the first amendment. First amendment rationales and
case law decided on nonconstitutional grounds supply vital clues
for predicting a future decision on the tort's constitutionality,6
but Ms. Heins offers scant analysis of either.
Her discussion of first amendment rationales is, understandably, brief. How can such speech advance political dialogue, further the search for truth, or help society strike a balance between
stability and orderly change?7 Ms. Heins does assert, with commendable forthrightness, that epithets used in one-on-one situations are "not wholly unrelated to 'individual self-fulfillment.' "8
However, Ms. Heins nowhere explains how a bigot gains selffulfillment from spewing racial invective. Perhaps she means that
some persons derive pleasure from browbeating blacks and other
minorities. But it seems unlikely that this is self-fulfillment envisioned by Emerson and other first amendment theoreticians. 9
Nor does Ms. Heins consider the body of tort decisions that
have bent the rules to afford relief for victims of racial slurs.
These cases are legion." ° They indicate an attitude of judicial
sympathy for the victims; as such, they signal that higher courts
may take similar positions. Ms. Heins should have discussed
them, if only to explain how and why they are, in her view,
wrong.
Without a valid first amendment rationale for protecting
slurs or an explanation of why the tort cases that protect the interest I espouse are wrong, Ms. Heins is left with disconnected
to the more exacting scrutiny afforded in such cases." Delgado, supra note 1, at
172-73.
6 First amendment cases presenting novel facts are often decided by reference
to certain basic first amendment values, e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 12-1, at 576-79 (1978).
Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 Yale L.J.
877, 878-88 (1963)(discussed in Delgado, supra note 1, at 175-79).
' Heins, supra note 2, at 590.
9Heins also asserts that racially charged speech may have artistic or dramatic
value, Heins, supra note 2, at 590. But she cannot be thinking of racial epithets
uttered in one-on-one situations, and directed by a person in a position of power
over the victim.
and authority
10 Delgado, supra note 1, at 175-78.
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dicta from disparate first amendment cases and decisions decided
on other grounds.
2. The prescriptive claim. Here her reasoning becomes more
interesting and the differences between us clearer. Racial epithets
should not be subject to tort sanctions even if the law permitted
it, Ms. Heins argues, because racial epithets are speech, and
speech should not be penalized without a very good reason."
She finds no very good reason. But she does not look very
hard, either. In contrast, the first half of my article does offer a
series of reasons for deterring racist speech in one-on-one
situations. 2 Ms. Heins' treatment of this part of the article is
revealing. The interests that the tort action would serve by deterring the harms I delineate-injury to the ideal of equality, to happiness, to psychological and physical well-being, as well as the
establishment of a caste system and harm to the perpetrator -are
lumped together by Ms. Heins under the summary label of "ending racism."' 3 This she grudgingly concedes to be a compelling
state interest. Even so, she writes, I have overlooked the Supreme
Court test requiring that the tort action must advance this interest
and do so in the least onerous way possible. 4
Her assertion that I have not shown that the tort will advance the end of controlling racism is incorrect. I expressly
address the manner in which a tort for racist speech will discourage such speech, establish a new public conscience, and ultimately
change attitudes. 5 Furthermore, what lesser means does Ms.
Heins have in mind-an administrative remedy? public school
programs? She does not tell us, remaining content with the simple
assertion that there may be an equally effective, but milder,
remedy somewhere, but that I have not found it.
A parting comment on the prescriptive claim. Normative
statements should be grounded, one would think, on a factual
understanding of the thing or action that is praised or con"

Heins, supra note 2, at 586, 592.

'2 Delgado, supra note 1, at 135-49 ("Psychological, Sociological, and
Political Effects of Racial Insults").
,"Heins, supra note 2, at 586.

Id.

14

1SDelgado, supra note 1, at 148-49.
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demned.' 6 Ms. Heins does not ground her normative rejection of
my argument on any factual grounds. Racism is not so bad, she
says, at least not bad enough to impose on freedom of expression. 7 Why not? Her response gives no indication. It makes no
reference to the social science literature on the effects of verbal
racism, neither that which I canvassed nor any other. We are left
with the distinct impression that she cares a great deal about free
speech but cares less about eliminating racism in society. That of
course is her right. But it does not constitute a reason for others
to join with her in that belief.
3. Politico-moralstanding. A claim that does deserve to be
taken seriously is Ms. Heins' veiled claim to politico-moral standing. This claim is a vital one, because a court could read Ms.
Heins' statement of the relative unimportance of racial insults,
observe that she represents a respected liberal organization, 18 and
conclude that she speaks for the victims of racial abuse when she
rejects a cause of action on their behalf.
Here I wish to speak clearly. The organization Ms. Heins
represents is composed mostly of white, male, middle-class
lawyers who care a great deal about free speech. They rank
speech over the right of women to be free from pornographic
exploitation' 9 and the right of elderly Jewish survivors to be free
from painful reminders of the Holocaust.2" That is, of course,
their right.
16 See Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 Yale L.J.
986, 996-1004 (1966)(moral assertions must be supported by reasons, otherwise

are indistinguishable from prejudices of the lawgiver and are unacceptable bases
for restricting liberty).
'1 Heins, supra note 2, at 592 (likening racist taunts to safety valves, by
which "[h]otheads blow off and release destructive energy," citing Beauharnais

v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286-87 (1952)(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
,1Ms. Heins is a staff attorney for the Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts.
11See Violent Pornography:Degradationof Women versus Right of Free
Speech, 8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 179 (1978)(ACLU position that pornography is protected expression).
20

The ACLU represented Nazi marchers in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
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But this does not mean that Ms. Heins or the ACLU speaks
for minority victims of racial epithets in making this ranking. Her
language makes clear she thinks she does. Combatting racial
abuse of this type is to "squander resources"'" (whose
resources?); moreover, "too much work (whose work?) remains
in the battle (whose battle?) against... racism"' to waste time
fighting its verbal manifestations. In her agenda, "loudmouths"'
should be free to vent abusive language at the expense of persons
of minority race. It is her right to advocate this. But to say that
this is in the best interest of the slur's victim, or that the victim
should sit still and take it because the ACLU has other things on
its mind are, to be charitable, highly debatable positions. 4
21Heins, supra note 2, at 592.
2

Id.

Id.
' At one point, Ms. Heins argues that my article is not only tactically unwise, but should not have been published, at least without some form of warning
label, Id. (thesis so "hostile to free expression [its hostility] ought to be made explicit, if it is to be advocated at alP' (emphasis added)). The unintentional irony
of her suggestion should be obvious. Cf. L.A. Times, March 9, 1983, § 4, at 1,
col. 2 (ACLU expected to challenge Department of Justice ruling that three Canadian films must wear labels identifying them as propaganda).
2

